A very wip configuration manager. Keeps config entries encoded as YAML in the filesystem, backs it up to 1Password, and syncs scrubbed copies to git. robots consume entries via 1Password Connect + Vault.
- but that talks UNIX, like [go-config-yourself](https://github.com/unRob/go-config-yourself) (plus its later `bash` + `jq` + `yq` [re-implementation](https://github.com/unRob/nidito/tree/0812e0caf6d81dd06b740701c3e95a2aeabd86de/.milpa/commands/nidito/config)'s multi-storage improvements),
- That emulates [git-crypt](https://github.com/AGWA/git-crypt)'s sweet git filters,
- and plays nice with [1Password's neat ecosystem](https://developer.1password.com/),
- as well as Hashicorp's [Vault](https://vaultproject.io/),
- but is still just files, folders and git for all I care.
- Allows the _structure_ of config trees to live happily **in the filesystem**: my home+cloud DC uses a lot of configuration spread over multiple files, one-off services don't really need the whole folder structure—I want a single tool to handle both.
- Prevents _secrets_ from ending up in **remote repositories**: I really dig `git-crypt`'s filters, not quite sure about how to safely operate them yet...
- Makes it **easy to edit** entries locally, as well as on the go: Easy for me to R/W, so YAML files, and 1Password's tools are pretty great for quick edits remotely.
- Is capable of bootstrapping other secret mangement processes: A single binary can talk to `op`'s CLI (hello, touch ID on macos!), to a 1password-connect server, and to vault as a plugin.
Schema for configuration and non-secret values live along the code, and are pushed to remote origins. Secrets can optionally and temporally be flushed to disk for editing or other sorts of operations. Git filters are available to prevent secrets from being pushed to remotes. Secrets are grouped into files, and every file gets its own 1Password item.
Secret values are specified using the `!!secret` YAML tag.
The ideal workflow is:
1. configs are written to disk, temporarily
2.`joao flush --redact`es them to 1password, and removes secrets from disk
3. configuration values, secret or not, are read from:
-`joao get` as needed by local processes. Mostly thinking of the human in the loop here, where `op` and suitable auth (i.e. touchid) workflows are available.
- from 1Password Connect, for when vault is not configured or available (think during provisioning)
- from Hashicorp Vault, for any automated process, after provisioning is complete.
`joao` operates on two modes, **repo** and **single-file**.
- **Repo** mode is useful to have multiple configuration files in a folder structure while configuring their 1Password mappings (vault and item names) in a single file.
- **Single-file** mode is useful when a single file contains all of the desired configuration, and its 1Password mapping is defined in that same file.
Basically, configs are kept in a directory and their relative path maps to their 1Password item name. A `.joao.yaml` file must exist at the root configuration directory, specifying the 1Password vault to use, and optionally a prefix to prepend ot every item name